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This paper considers a model of an open economy in which the degree
of income-tax progressivity influences the interaction among openness,
central bank independence, and the inflation rate. Our model suggests that an
increase in the progressivity of the tax system induces a smaller response in
real output to a change in the price level. This implies that increased incometax progressivity reduces the equilibrium inflation rate and that the effect of
increased income-tax progressivity on inflation is smaller when the central
bank places a higher weight on inflation or when there is greater openness.
Examination of cross-country inflation data provides empirical support for
these key predictions.
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1. Introduction
A significant literature has developed since Romer’s (1993)
seminal paper exploring the nature of the relationship between the
extent of openness to international trade and inflation. Romer’s
motivation for the negative dependence of inflation on openness
observed in cross-country data hinged on the idea that greater
openness might worsen the terms of the output-inflation trade-off,
thereby reducing a monetary authority’s incentive to inflate. This
rationale best applies to countries sizable enough to affect
international relative prices, and Lane (1997) explored how greater
openness can reduce the potential output gains from unexpected
inflation in non-traded-goods sectors with imperfectly competitive
goods markets and sticky prices. Nevertheless, Temple’s (2002)
examination of the relationship between openness and sacrifice ratios
across a range of nations cast doubt on Romer’s proposed explanation
of the openness–inflation relationship. Daniels and VanHoose (2006)
and Razin and Yuen (2002) offered alternative perspectives indicating
that in fact the sacrifice ratio should respond positively to an increased
degree of openness, yet inflation nevertheless should decline. Daniels
et al. (2005) and Razin and Loungani (2005) have provided empirical
support for a positive relationship between openness and the sacrifice
ratio, while preserving the predicted inverse relationship between
openness and inflation found in the data by Romer and others.
Missing from this literature to date has been consideration of the
role that a nation’s tax structure likely has on the equilibrium inflation
rate. This is somewhat surprising for two reasons. First, some
researchers have questioned whether the trade openness–inflation
relationship either may be illusory (Terra, 1998; Ball, 2006) or may
have shifted or even broken down since the early 1990s (Bleaney,
1999). Second, the marginal tax rate is a key supply-side factor
influencing the out-put-inflation relationship and hence the equilibrium
inflation rate. The considerable cross-country variation in degrees of
marginal tax rates suggests that the interplay between the effects of
trade openness and income-tax progressivity – measured by the ratio
of marginal to average tax rates – should be explored.
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This paper considers an open-economy framework which
accounts for the fact that in a more progressive tax system, the
marginal tax rate is more responsive to a given change in real income.
Consequently, an increase in real output induced by a rise in the price
level raises the marginal tax rate by a larger amount, which reduces
the actual rise in output generated by a given increase in the price
level. This reduces the incentive to increase money growth in an effort
to raise the price level with an aim to boost output. Thus, money
growth and inflation are lower, ceteris paribus, when the tax system is
more progressive.
Our model also indicates that the degree of central bank
independence also plays a role in influencing how the progressivity of
the income-tax system and openness affect inflation. This is true
because central bank independence has its own effects on the latter
two variables, thereby conditioning the impacts of variations in
income-tax progressivity and openness.
To evaluate the predictions forthcoming from the theoretical
model, we consider cross-country data on income-tax progressivity,
openness, central bank independence, and inflation. Empirical analysis
of cross-country inflation rates provides empirical support favoring the
theoretical prediction of a negative relationship between inflation and
the progressivity of the income-tax system. This analysis also supports
the theory’s subsidiary implications that greater openness and
increased central bank independence both reduce the effects of
income-tax progressivity on inflation – and vice versa. Thus, a larger
degree of income-tax progressivity may reduce the negative influence
of greater openness on inflation.
The next section presents our theoretical model and its
predictions regarding how income-tax progressivity, openness, central
bank independence affect the inflation rate. Section 3 assesses the
empirical implications of our analysis and evaluates the evidence.
Section 4 summarizes our conclusions.
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2. A model of the interplay among openness,
progressive taxation, and inflation
The theoretical framework is based in part on the model
developed in Daniels and VanHoose (2006). There are numerous
atomistic firms, indexed i, distributed uniformly along a unit interval. A
portion,

Ω, of firms have workforces that contractually set nominal

wages in advance of labor-market clearing. Spot labor markets
determine nominal wages in the portion of firms, 1-

Ω, that do not

have such contracts. Duca and VanHoose (2001) have shown in a
closed-economy version of this basic framework that if risk-neutral
firms and risk-averse workers face common aggregate shocks and
heterogeneously distributed firm-specific disturbances, Ω typically lies
between zero and unity but declines as the variability of firm-specific
disturbances increases relative to the volatility of aggregate shocks. To
maintain tractability, we treat Ω as an exogenous parameter and
thereby abstract from considerations of disturbances that influence the
share of firms with nominal wage contracts.
We also consider the competitive limit of the Daniels–VanHoose
framework, in which we take into account income taxation. The output
produced by a given firm i is

yi = ali,
(1)
Where yi is the log of output and li is the log of employment at firm i.
We abstract from productivity or other shocks that would not influence
trend inflation in the standard Barro and Gordon (1983) discretionarypolicy framework. The domestic nation’s income-expenditure
equilibrium condition (for a derivation of this Cobb–Douglas
approximation, see, for instance, Canzoneri and Henderson, 1991; or
Bryson et al., 1993) is given by

𝑦 = 𝜂 (𝑝∗ + 𝑠 − 𝑝) + (1 − 𝛽)𝑦 + 𝛽𝑦 ∗
(2)
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where
1

1

𝑦 ≡ ∫0 𝑦𝑖 𝑑𝑖

∫0 𝑝𝑖 𝑑𝑖

is the log of aggregate domestic output;

𝑝 ≡

is the log of the aggregate domestic price level; the average

β, is a fraction; η is the elasticity of desired
spending with respect to the real exchange rate; p * is the log of the
aggregate foreign price level; s is the log of the domestic currency
price of foreign currency; and p* is the log of aggregate foreign
propensity to import,

output. Specifying analogous structural relationships for a foreign
nation would yield a two-country framework in which y* and p* would
be endogenous variables, but here we assume the output and prices
abroad are exogenously determined. Henceforth, the foreign money
stock, foreign price level, and foreign output are normalized at unity,
so that

p* and y* equal zero. Finally, domestic income is determined

by the quantity equation

y = m - p,
(3)
where

m is the log of the money stock and where the log of velocity

has been normalized at a value of zero.
Using (1) in the profit function,

PiYi - WiLi, yields the labor

demand function for a firm i (with the intercept suppressed because it
plays no role in our subsequent analysis):
𝑑

−(𝑤𝑖−𝑝)

𝑖

1−𝑎

𝑙 =

,
(4)

Where

wi is the log of the nominal wage for the firm.

Workers can consume both domestically produced output and
foreign-produced goods. Consequently, labor supply to firms depends
on the after-tax real wage computed in terms of the overall price
workers pay for a basket of both domestic and foreign goods:

𝑠
𝑙 = 𝜆[𝑤𝑖 − (1 − 𝛽)𝑝 − 𝛽𝑠 − 𝜏],
𝑖

(5)
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where

λ > 0 and where τ is the marginal tax rate applied to workers’

wage income, with all revenues collected by the government used to
fund the distribution of lump-sum transfers to agents. Although
standard labor theory indicates that tax-rate effects on labor supply
can be muted by conflicting substitution and income effects, work
building on Hausman (1981) has generally concluded that the
hypothesized negative effect holds true – though the empirical
magnitude of the effect depends on the estimated functional form and
appears to vary somewhat across countries.2
For firms with or without nominal wage contracts, the fullinformation, market-clearing wage satisfies (4) and (5) simultaneously
and equals

𝑤
̂𝑖 =

[𝜆(1−𝛼)+1]𝑝+𝜆(1−𝛼)𝛽(𝑠−𝑝)+𝜆(1−𝛼)𝜏
[𝜆(1−𝛼)+1]

.

(6)
Hence, this nominal wage rate, which is the wage actually paid by firm

i if it is among the share, 1-Ω , of firms without nominal wage
contracts, depends positively on the marginal income-tax rate.
Substitution of (6) into either (4) or (5) and the result into (1) yields
output of a noncontract firm with market-clearing (mc) wages:

𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑐 =

−𝛼𝜆𝛽(𝑠−𝑝)−𝛼𝜆(1−𝛼)𝜏
.
[𝜆(1−𝛼)+1]

(7)
Thus, output of a firm without wage contracts responds negatively to a
real depreciation of the home currency, because this reduces the
purchasing power of workers’ wages and thereby generates a ceteris
paribus decline in labor supply and hence a decline in spot-market
employment at noncontract firms. Because a higher marginal tax rate
induces a decline in labor supply that requires paying a higher nominal
wage, a noncontract firm’s output also depends negatively on the
marginal tax rate.
For atomistic wage setters within the fraction, Ω, of firms with
nominal wage contracts, the contract wage is equal to the expected
value of the market clearing wage:
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𝑤𝑖𝑐

[𝜆(1 − 𝛼) + 1]𝑝𝑒 + 𝜆(1 − 𝛼)𝛽(𝑠 𝑒 − 𝑝𝑒 ) + 𝜆(1 − 𝛼)𝜏 𝑒
=
[𝜆(1 − 𝛼) + 1]

(8)
Substituting (8) into (4) and the result into (1) yields output of a firm
with wage contracts:

𝑦𝑖𝑐 =

𝛼[𝜆(1−𝛼)+1](𝑝−𝑝𝑒 )−𝛼𝜆(1−𝛼)𝛽(𝑠 𝑒 −𝑝𝑒 )−𝛼𝜆(1−𝛼)𝜏𝑒
(1−𝛼)[𝜆[1−𝛼]+1]

.

(9)
Thus, output increases in response to price-level prediction errors, an
anticipated real home currency appreciation, or an anticipated cut in
the marginal tax rate.
To explore the implications of the structure of a nation’s tax
system for the relationship between openness, the priceresponsiveness of output, and inflation, we follow McCallum and
Whitaker (1979), Benavie and Froyen (1986) and Waller and
VanHoose (1989) by considering an approximation to the marginal tax
rate function given by

𝜏 = 𝜏0 + 𝜏1 𝑦,
(10)
where τ0 is a base level of the marginal tax rate and τ1 determines the
degree of progressivity of the tax system. If τ1 = 0, the marginal tax
rate is independent of income, implying a proportional tax system. For

τ1 < 0, the tax system is regressive, and for τ1 > 0, the tax system is
progressive.3

𝑦𝑖𝑐 = 𝑦 𝑐 for all 𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝛺],
= 𝑦 𝑚𝑐 for all 𝑖 ∈ [𝛺, 1]. It follows that 𝑦 = 𝛺𝑦 𝑐 + (1 − 𝛺)𝑦 𝑚𝑐 .
Firms behave identically, so that

𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑐

Together with the marginal tax rate function in (10), (7) and (9) then
imply a semi-reduced-form solution for output that can be combined
with (3) and (2) to determine the semi-reduced forms for the log of
the price level and the nominal exchange rate in terms of expected
values of the various macroeconomic variables. Substitution of these
solutions back in the model then yields a semi-reduced-form
expression for aggregate output:
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𝑦=

𝛺𝛼[𝜆(1 − 𝛼) + 1](𝑝 − 𝑝𝑒 ) − 𝛼𝜆(1 − 𝛼)[(1 − 𝛺)𝛽(𝑠 − 𝑝)] + 𝛺𝛽(𝑠 𝑒 − 𝑝𝑒 ) + 𝛺𝜏1 (𝑚𝑒 − 𝑝 𝑒 ) + 𝜏0
(1 − 𝛼)[𝜆(1 − 𝛼) + 1] + (1 − 𝛺)𝛼𝜆(1 − 𝛼)𝜏1

(10)
This implies that the responsiveness of aggregate output to a change
in the domestic price level is given by

𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑝

𝛺𝛼[𝜆(1−𝛼)+1]+(1−𝛺)𝛼𝜆(1−𝛼)𝛽

= (1−𝛼)[𝜆(1−𝛼)+1]+(1−𝛺)𝛼𝜆(1−𝛼)𝜏 ,
1

which is directly related to the magnitude of β. Consequently, as in
Daniels and VanHoose (2006), an increase in openness increases the
sensitivity of output to a rise in the price level. In addition, this pricesensitivity of output is inversely related to the τ1 parameter and hence
to the degree of progressivity of the income-tax system. In a more
progressive tax system, the marginal tax rate is more responsive to a
given change in real income. An increase in real output induced by a
given price-level increase thereby boosts the marginal tax rate by a
larger amount under a more progressive income tax, which in turn
tends to depress to a greater extent the actual output increase that is
forthcoming from the given price-level increase. Hence, an increase in
the extent of income-tax progressivity brings about a smaller response
in real output to a change in the price level, ceteris paribus, in a nation
with a more progressive tax system. Following Barro and Gordon
(1983), we consider a Nash game involving the central bank and wage
setters in which the central bank seeks to minimize the policy loss
function,
𝐿 = 𝐸[(𝑦 − 𝑦̂)2 + 𝑏𝑐𝑏 𝜓 2 ],
(12)
where 𝑦̂is the nondistorted, full-information economy-wide output
under market clearing, 𝑏𝑐𝑏 is the relative weight that the central bank
places on the inflation component of its loss function, and ψ is the CPI
inflation rate. Re-solving the model under full information—that is,
with 𝑠 𝑒 = 𝑠, 𝑝𝑒 = 𝑝, and 𝑚𝑒 = 𝑚 ex ante – and setting 𝜏0 = 𝜏1 = 0yields
the nondistorted, full-information output level of zero. Consequently,
𝑦̂ = 0 in (12). Under the simplifying assumption that 𝑝−1 = 𝑠−1 = 0, the
CPI inflation rate is 𝜓 = (1 − 𝛽)𝑝 + 𝛽𝑠 . Minimizing (12) with respect to
m and solving for 𝜓 ultimately yields
𝜓=(

𝑏𝑐𝑏 (𝜂 − 𝛽 2 ){(𝜆 + 1)(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼𝛺[𝜆(1 − 𝛼) + 1]} − 𝛢−1 𝜆𝛼 2 (1 − 𝛼)𝜂𝛺[𝜆(1 − 𝛼) + 1]
)
𝑏𝑐𝑏 [𝜆(1 − 𝛼) + 1][1 − 𝛼(1 − 𝛺)]
𝜆𝛼(1−𝛼)

× (𝜂(1−𝛼)[𝜆(1−𝛼)+1]+𝜆𝛼(1−𝛼)𝜂𝜏

1 +𝛽

2

) 𝜏0 ,
(13)

2

where 𝛢 ≡ [𝜂(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛽 𝛺𝛼][𝜆(1 − 𝛼) + 1] + (1 + 𝛺)𝜆𝛼(𝜂𝜏1 + 𝛽

2 ).
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An immediate implication of (13) is that

𝜕𝜓
𝜕𝜏1

< 0, so that an

increase in the degree of progressivity of the tax system
unambiguously reduces the equilibrium inflation rate under discretion.
An increase in tax progressivity makes output less sensitive to changes
in the price level, which in turn reduces the incentive to increase
money growth in an effort to raise the price level in an attempt to
boost output. As a consequence, money growth and CPI inflation are
lower, ceteris paribus, when the tax system is more progressive.
Further evaluation of the expression for

𝜕𝜓
𝜕𝜏1

indicates that either

an increase in 𝑏𝑐𝑏 or in a rise in β causes the absolute value of this
derivative to decrease. An increase in the relative weight placed on
inflation, 𝑏𝑐𝑏 , in the central bank’s loss function reduces inflation, so
the marginal effect on inflation of greater tax progressivity is lower at
larger values of 𝑏𝑐𝑏 . As in Daniels and VanHoose (2006) and Daniels et
al. (2005), the direct effect of greater openness (b) is to increase the
sensitivity of output with respect to the price level, so an increase in β
tends to counter the effect of greater tax progressivity on inflation,
thereby reducing the absolute value of

𝜕𝜓
.
𝜕𝜏1

In general, both the direct effect of greater openness and the
effects of changes in the sensitivity of inflation with respect to
openness resulting from variations in the degree of tax progressivity or
the central bank’s loss weight on inflation depend on relative
magnitudes of parameter values. Evaluation of the direct effect of an
increase in the degree of openness, β, on inflation yields sufficient, but
unnecessary, conditions for greater openness to reduce inflation (that
is,

𝜕𝜓
𝜕𝛽

< 0): (1) most of the weight in the loss function is on the

inflation objective (a sufficiently large value of 𝑏𝑐𝑏 ) or (2) the marginal
propensity to import is sufficiently larger than the sensitivity of
expenditures with respect to the real exchange rate (𝛽 2 > 𝜂 ). If

𝜕𝜓
𝜕𝛽

< 0,

then it is also true that an increase in either 𝜏1 or in 𝑏𝑐𝑏 generate
reductions in the absolute magnitude of this derivative; that is, in this
case, either a greater degree of progressivity of the tax system or an
increased policy weight on inflation tend to reduce the effect of
increased openness on inflation.
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The reason for the potential ambiguity in the inflation effects of
openness is that greater openness exerts two conflicting effects. On
one hand, as in Daniels and VanHoose (2006) and Daniels et al.
(2006), because labor supply depends on the real wage computed in
terms of the overall price that workers pay for a basket of both
domestic and foreign goods, a real depreciation of the home currency
reduces the purchasing power of market-clearing wages, which
generates a ceteris paribus fall in labor supply that, in turn, causes a
decline in spot-market employment. Thus, the output of firms without
wage contracts responds negatively to a real depreciation of the home
currency, and this effect is enhanced in a more open economy,
ultimately implying that a greater degree of openness causes output to
be more responsive to inflation. This, in turn, tends to increase the
incentive for the central bank to push up money growth and generate
higher equilibrium inflation.
On the other hand, increased openness reduces the extent to
which an unanticipated real depreciation can potentially generate an
increase in output. To see this, note that (2) implies, under the
maintained assumption 𝑝∗ = 0, that, ex ante, aggregate expenditures
are given by 𝑦 = 𝛽 −1 𝜂(𝑠 − 𝑝). An increase in the value of the marginal
propensity to import, β, relative to the sensitivity of expenditures with
respect to the real exchange rate, η, thereby reduces the extent to
which changes in the real exchange rate brought about by variations in
the money stock can affect aggregate demand, ex ante. This, in turn,
reduces the incentive for a discretionary central bank to increase
money growth.
On net, therefore, the ex post effect of greater openness on
equilibrium inflation is ambiguous in the present model, although as
noted above, it is more likely to be negative if 𝛽 2 > 𝜂. As noted above,
from an ex ante perspective, a sufficiently higher initial value of the
marginal propensity to import relative to an initial value of the
expenditure responsiveness to the real exchange rate reduces the
extent to which a monetary expansion can boost output via a
discretionary increase in money growth. At the same time, because
CPI inflation is 𝜓 = 𝑝 + 𝛽(𝑠 − 𝑝), a rise in the magnitude of balso has the
effect of enlarging the extent to which the real exchange rate plays a
role in determining equilibrium CPI inflation, which increases the ex
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ante incentive for the central bank to reduce money growth. This
explains why if β is sufficiently large relative to g, increased openness
is more likely to reduce equilibrium inflation.

3. Empirical implications and evidence
Following are the empirical implications of the forgoing
discussion:
i.
ii.
iii.

Increased income-tax progressivity reduces the equilibrium
inflation rate.
The effect of increased income-tax progressivity on inflation is
smaller when the central bank places a higher weight on
inflation or when there is greater openness.
The effect of greater openness on inflation is generally
empirically ambiguous, but if this effect is negative, then it is
absolutely smaller due to increased income-tax progressivity or
when the central bank places a higher weight on inflation.

To measure the degree of income-tax progressivity (Tax) for
individual nations, we use the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the
average tax rate.4 The marginal tax rate is measured by the change in
single employees’ social security contribution and personal income-tax
payments in response to a change in gross wage earnings. The
average tax rate is the level of social security and tax payments
divided by the level of gross wage earnings. Both the marginal tax rate
and the average tax rate are from Source OECD.5
Our measure of the degree of central bank independence (CBI),
is taken from Franzese (2002), which is a weighted average of legal
independence, a characterization of independence based on answers to
a survey completed by individuals at central banks (Cukierman, 1992),
economic independence, political independence (Grilli et al., 1991),
and Bade and Parkin’s (1982) index of central bank independence.
This measure of CBI is a constant value across time for each country.
The inflation rate is based on the GDP deflator, and openness is
measured as the ratio of imports to GDP, both derived from the IMF
International Financial Statistics. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics
on the sample data.6

Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol 31, No. 3 (September 2009): pg. 969-988. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

11

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Table 2 reports regression results for an annual sample of 17
countries covering the period 1979-1999.7 Because of the time-series
nature of this data set, all pooled/panel regressions are estimated
using OLS with robust standard errors.8 Column (1) of the table
provides results for the base specification that controls only for central
bank independence and openness. The coefficients for both variables
are negative and statistically significant.
Column (2) of Table 2 reports a re-specification in which the tax
progressivity measure is added. The estimated coefficient for the
Openness variable is not statistically significant in this specification.
The tax progressivity (Tax) coefficient, however, is negative and
statistically significant, consistent with the theoretical model’s key
implication that increased income-tax progressivity reduces the
equilibrium inflation rate.
The regression specification in column (3) of Table 2 adds
interactions of tax progressivity and central bank independence
(Tax*CBI) and for tax progressivity and openness (Tax*Openness).
The estimated negative Openness coefficient is once again statistically
significant in this broadened specification. The interaction term
between tax progressivity and central bank independence is also
statistically significant and positive, consistent with the theoretical
model’s prediction that the (negative) effect of greater income-tax
progressivity on inflation is smaller with greater central bank
independence (assumed consistent with a higher central bank loss
weight on inflation). Consistent with the theoretical framework’s
implication that the (negative) effect of greater income-tax
progressivity on inflation is smaller with greater openness, the
estimated coefficient on the interaction term between tax progressivity
and openness is positive (indicating a absolute smaller effect of tax
progressivity), but this coefficient is statistically insignificant at
conventional levels (with a p-value of 15%).
Column (4) in Table 2 considers the impact that outliers might
have on the results. To test for outliers, we use the dfits test, Cooksd
test, and the Welsch distance test on the regression model in column
(3). The results for all three tests imply outliers in 1980 for Italy, New
Zealand, and the United States. These three observations are deleted
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from the specification in column (3) to generate the results in column
(4). Controlling for these outliers has no practical impact on the results
described above.
According to hypothesis (iii) implied by theoretical framework, if
openness is statistically significant and negative, then its effect
becomes absolutely smaller as the degree of tax progressivity
increases. Consistent with this hypothesis, the estimated coefficient on
Tax*Openness is consistently positive, but it is never significant at a
level of 10% or less. To further explore the third hypothesis, column
(5) adds an interaction term between central bank independence and
openness to the specification in column (4). The only resulting changes
are a positive but statistically insignificant effect of openness on
inflation and an improvement in the p-value of the Tax*CBI interaction
variable. In addition, the estimated effect of the openness-CBI
interaction term is negative and significant. Hence, there is support for
the theoretical prediction that the impact of openness on inflation is
empirically ambiguous once the degrees of income-tax progressivity
and central bank independence are taken into account.
We also consider some recent results regarding the relationship
between openness and inflation. According to Levin and Piger (2002)
and Ihrig and Marquez (2003), time-series inflation data exhibit a
break around the late 1980s and early 1990s. Bleaney (1999) further
notes that around the time of this same break, the economic and
statistical significance of the openness-inflation relationship began to
diminish among developing nations. Including a dummy variable with
a value of zero up until 1989 and a value of unity for the remainder of
the sample period had little impact on our results. The p-value for
Tax*CBI increased slightly but is still significant at the 5% level, and
the p-value for Tax*Openness decreased to the 5–10% significance
range (with a p-value of 5.5%).9

4. Conclusion
This paper has developed an open-economy framework
indicating that the structure of the tax system should worsen the
terms of the output-inflation trade-off and reduce the equilibrium
inflation rate. Our theoretical analysis also suggests that increased

Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol 31, No. 3 (September 2009): pg. 969-988. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

13

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

openness and greater central bank independence should contribute to
lower inflation. Yet it also indicates that increases in each of the three
variables should decrease the extent to which any of the other two
variables tends to decrease inflation. Study of the inflation rates of
seventeen nations provides support for our predictions regarding direct
and interactive effects of income-tax progressivity, openness, and
central bank independence on inflation. Our empirical analysis of
cross-country data results support both predictions. Increases in
income-tax progressivity, openness, and central bank independence
each contribute individually to lower inflation. When simultaneous
effects of increases in all three variables are considered, however, the
inflation-reducing impacts of a higher degree of income-tax
progressivity and greater central bank independence appear to leave a
smaller role for an inflation-reducing effect of increased openness.
The role of taxation as a factor influencing the interactions
among openness, central bank independence, and inflation rates has
not received attention in the literature. The theoretical and empirical
conclusions of this paper indicate that more consideration should be
given to the role of fiscal variables as factors conditioning equilibrium
inflation rates in open economies.
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3. Note that if the level of income-tax revenues is Ζ = 𝑧0 𝑌 𝑧1 where 𝑧0 > 0 and Y
is the level of income. The marginal tax rate is 𝜏 =

𝜕𝑍
𝜕𝑌

= 𝑧1 𝑧0 𝑌 𝑧1−1 , which

implies that the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the average tax rate
(𝑍𝑌 −1 ) is equal to 𝑧1 . In addition, the effect of a rise in income on the
tax rate is

𝜕𝑍
𝜕𝑌

= 𝑧1 𝑧0 (𝑧1 − 1)𝑌 𝑧1−2, so that

𝜕𝜏
𝜕𝑌

is monotonically related to 𝑧1 .

The tax system is progressive for 𝑧1 > 1, so that

𝜕𝜏
𝜕𝑌

> 0, which in the

linear approximation for τ in (10) implies 𝜏1 > 0 for a progressive tax
system, where 𝜏1 is an approximation to
is regressive for 𝑧1 < 1, so that

𝜕𝜏
𝜕𝑌

𝜕𝜏
𝜕𝑌

. Conversely, the tax system

< 0, implying 𝜏1 < 0 in (10).

4. As discussed in footnote 1, the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the average
tax rate is monotonically related to the income-tax progressivity
parameter 𝜏1 in the theoretical model and hence is the best available
empirical proxy for this parameter.
5. During the 1979-1993 interval, the OECD reports tax rates only for odd
years. For this period, missing observations on the rates were imputed
using the average of the two adjacent rates. All of the data used in
this paper and all regression results are available upon request.
6. Although we have only 21 years of data, we considered the unit root
properties of the data. Based on the Levin, Lin and Chu t-statistic for
panel data, we were able to reject a common unit root process for the
four main variables.
7. The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. We limit
consideration to pre-2000 data in light of formal formation of the
European Monetary Union beginning in 1999.
8. Because CBI is a constant value across time for each country, we are
unable to estimate a fixed-effects model.
9. In addition, we explored the robustness of our results by including
(separately) year dummies, a time trend, and also specified that the
disturbances are (i) panel-heteroskedastic and contemporaneously
correlated, (ii) panel-heteroskedastic but not correlated, and (iii)
independent across panels. The only impact on the results described
above is that the year dummies, time trend, and assumption (i) on the
disturbances each improved the p-value of the Tax-Openness variable
such that is became significant at conventional levels. Overall, the
effect of openness on inflation shows the greatest sensitivity to model
specification and controls for model breaks and outliers.
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